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AIG and the Fed: Prologue to Future Financial Regulation?  
John A. Tatom 
Financial sector regulatory reform has been a leading national issue since the U.S. Treasury issued its 
Blueprint for reform in spring (2008).1 The mortgage foreclosure and financial crises reinforced popular 
interest in whether the U.S. regulatory framework was deficient, whether those deficiencies contributed to 
the crises, and how to fix the regulatory framework. Policymakers have focused on the recession, the 
foreclosure crisis and the bank confidence problem over the past year, with less attention to regulatory 
overhaul, but those priorities appear to be changing.  The Obama administration called for renewed 
regulatory reform efforts on February 25, 2009, and congressional leaders are hard at work on reform.2  
The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (2009) issued a call for federal regulatory consolidation, 
simplification and reform. A working group of the Group of 30 (2009) also released a key document 
calling for financial regulatory reform in January and regulators and policy leaders are looking forward to 
the release of a Group of 20 report on regulatory reform in April 2009.  The broad agenda is moving to 
the table.  Meanwhile, some key decisions in the United States, particularly concerning the failure and 
bailout of AIG and some investment banks in fall 2008, have established precedents for a new regulatory 
framework and policies. Where policymakers go from here is not certain, but the ideas on the table and 
the direction of policy suggest that the role of the Federal Reserve (Fed) in financial regulation will 
become central, at least in critical periods.   
President Obama called for oversight of all financial institutions that pose systemic risks to financial 
markets and urged the public to be assured that the Federal Reserve “understands the institutions it insures 
and actively monitors them to keep their risk-taking in check.”3 He also said that an overhauled financial 
regulatory structure “must be strong enough to withstand both systemwide stress and the failure of one or 
more large institutions.” The role of the Federal Reserve as a “financial stability” regulator, called for in 
the Blueprint, is widely expected to be central to the new regulatory system, especially because it has 
stepped up as such a regulator in the current financial crisis and perhaps because there is no other existing 
institution that is available to play such a role. A financial stability regulator, as proposed in the Blueprint, 
would have broad new sweeping powers of oversight and control over financial policies and actions of all 
firms operating in the United States.   
I. The Fed as the New Financial Stability Regulator 
The Fed has stepped in to the bailout of AIG because of concern of systemic risk. In the Blueprint, an 
overarching financial stability regulator was envisioned and the Fed was viewed as a prime candidate for 
this authority.  More recently, this concern has narrowed from financial stability to systemic risk. The 
other popular stereotypical example of potential systemic risk today is the potential failure of Citigroup 
that has justified Treasury funding of some $45 billion so far. 
                                                            
1 See U.S. Treasury (2008).  
2 See Hitt (2009). Not all analysts agree that the financial crisis arose from inadequate or reduced regulation, 
though some blame the federal government and some regulators specifically for not performing their authorized 
responsibilities.  See Gramm (2009) for example.  Moreover, calls for regulatory reform predate the financial crisis, 
especially the development of the Treasury’s Blueprint (2008). 
3 See Hitt (2009).  
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The notion of systemic risk has become quite nebulous and is subject to considerable abuse in regulatory 
discussions.  Largely it now refers to situations where there is a high correlation of asset prices so that a 
decline in one firm or group of firms has negative effects on the solvency of other firms.  Of course the 
list of potential positive correlations in asset prices is endless so the list of potential systemic risk 
situations is equally endless.  It is not limited to large firms, or to financial services firms.  Both are 
examples of the “Too Big to Fail Doctrine,” which was widely presumed to have been repealed in the 
early 1990s.4 Instead, the doctrine, once applicable only to banks and their regulators, has been expanded 
to other financial institutions via the assertion of Fed responsibility for them. For both Citigroup and AIG, 
emphasis is put on the size of the institutions and their global reach, as if the international implications of 
a failure increase the potential systemic risk or contagion. The extension of Fed oversight to other 
financial institutions besides banks extends so far to AIG, investment banks, commercial paper issuers, 
brokers and dealers, issuers of money market mutual funds and to other issuers of securitized debt or to 
holders of securitized assets.     
The original basis of a regulatory role in assisting an illiquid financial institution in avoiding insolvency, 
in the Fed’s case as “lender of last resort” for banks, was the risk to the nation’s payments system in the 
event of bank failure.  This was based on the notion that depositors cannot distinguish good, or solvent 
,banks from bad, or insolvent, banks, so a bank failure could create panic as depositors run on banks to 
salvage their deposits at both good and bad banks.  As banks are forced into fire sales of assets to obtain 
cash to meet withdrawals, asset values decline and banks are forced into insolvency and failure.  The 
potential for such a systemic failure because of runs was largely ended in the mid 1930s with the 
introduction of deposit insurance.  At least up to generous limits today, depositors do not have to worry 
about access to their deposits because deposits are insured.  Even if banks fail, the payments system 
cannot easily be forced into collapse because depositors do not run.  However, for the largest banks and 
the largest depositors, there could be runs on deposits that exceed the insurance limits. These deposits are 
well managed, though, so that the likelihood of a bank failure because of a run is minimal.  Moreover, the 
Fed has powers to lend that are sufficient to keep a solvent bank from becoming insolvent and failing in 
the event of a run on one or on many banks.  These powers were redefined and reinforced following the 
U.S. savings and loan crisis.5  Today the notion of systemic risk is more vague and seems to apply to any 
situation where risk sensitivity grows or revenue losses occur because of developments in another firm. 
There is a loose presumption that such potential losses are to be compensated or underwritten by 
government entities.     
II. The Fed and AIG  
The Federal Reserve took on oversight and intervention in the potential failure of AIG in September 
2008, at the same time that investment banks Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch failed, with the latter 
forced to be acquired by Bank of America. Initially the Fed entered into an agreement to lend AIG $85 
billion. In November 2008, the Fed reduced their direct line of credit to AIG to $60 billion, when the 
Treasury agreed to lend AIG $40 billion from the Troubled Asset Recovery Program (TARP).  This 
original agreement has been changed three times in its first five months, the latest changes coming on 
March 2, 2009 when the Treasury agreed to lend a further $30 billion and the Fed modified some terms of 
                                                            
4 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 was intended to circumscribe the ability to 
have a financial institution that is too big to fail to a degree that many analysts thought that no institution would 
ever again meet the requirements.   See Kaufman (12007) for an update on its coverage and its shortcomings.  
5 See Kaufman (2008) for a discussion of the powers of regulators to avoid systemic runs and bank failures and 
their policies to minimize the costs of bank failures.   
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the loans it had made.  As of February 25, 2009, however, the Fed held $38 billion in direct loans to AIG, 
$27.7 billion in a structured investment vehicle (SIV) called Maiden Lane II, which houses collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs) purchased from AIG, and $18.6 billion in Maiden Lane III, which houses 
residential mortgage backed securities purchased from AIG, a total of $84. 3 billion.6  The Fed originally 
loaned the two SIVs $30 billion and $22.5 billion, respectively. Thus, within only a few months, the 
Fed’s two AIG related SIVs have lost over $6 billion.   
Fed losses on loans to non-bank financial institutions are well outside the normal mandate of the Fed and 
raise questions about its financial integrity and the soundness of its financial judgment and its ability to 
conduct a sound and responsible monetary policy.  Not surprisingly, the Fed has reduced its willingness 
to lend to AIG and reportedly has insisted that the Treasury take on any new financial exposure to AIG, 
but they have not reduced their exposure to other non-bank financial institutions.  
Critics of the proposal that the Fed take on the role as a financial stability regulator with super powers to 
examine and control any financial practice anywhere in the economy point to its narrow function as the 
central bank and monetary authority, and as a regulator of banks. They emphasize the Fed’s lack of 
success as a regulator and the questionable presumption that a country requires a special regulator to 
promote financial stability.  A well run monetary policy and regulators that properly maintain the 
solvency of the nations’ banks have historically been regarded to be sufficient to avoid financial crises. 
Justification for regulation of bank solvency primarily arises because of government-sponsored deposit 
insurance; solvency regulation is a legitimate means to hold down the potential cost of insurance to 
taxpayers and has the side effect of improving financial stability. The evidence on the Fed’s new lending 
programs for private financial firms, especially to take on toxic debt from Bear Stearns and AIG, suggests 
that there is an inherent conflict in its pursuit of its own independence, financial integrity and its role as 
monetary policymaker and its new private sector lending and oversight responsibilities.     
No doubt the debate over whether countries need a financial stability regulator and whether the Fed 
should be diverted from its existing role as central bank to provide new regulatory services will be heated, 
especially since it will also create turf struggles with existing regulators of financial services firms and 
because it may also stir an ongoing debate over whether the federal government should charter and 
regulate large insurance companies, as the G30 has recommended,  or perhaps any insurance company, as 
envisioned in the Blueprint and in congressional proposals to permit optional federal charters.         
III. The AIG Problem 
AIG was one of the first insurance companies to suffer large losses on mortgage backed or related 
securities in 2008.  During the first three quarters of 2008, AIG had losses of $37.6 billion, but in the 
fourth quarter, losses for the year grew by $61.7 billion to a total of $99.3 billion for the year. Losses in 
2007 were large but reached “only” $10 billion. The fourth quarter 2008 loss was the largest for any firm 
in U.S. history. Strikingly, only $25.9 billion of the fourth quarter loss was due to mortgage-backed 
securities or credit default swaps, the primary source of losses earlier at AIG and at other financial firms 
seriously affected by the financial crisis. Financial sector losses are spreading well beyond the residential 
mortgage-related debt, to commercial real estate-related debt and to other new securities including credit 
                                                            
6 See Board of Governors (2009). 
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default swaps, other collateralized debt obligations, auction rate securities and other newer and untested 
securities. 
Assets and income at AIG are shrinking rapidly. Premiums fell 22 percent from the fourth quarter of 2007 
to the last quarter of 2008, and assets fell $140 billion in the just the last quarter of 2008 to $860 billion.  
Fed and Treasury holdings of AIG claims have risen to over $150 billion, or more than 16 percent of AIG 
total assets and more than 80 percent of equity in AIG. Continuing losses will fall disproportionately on 
the Fed and Treasury, raising the question of whether either institution has a threshold beyond which their 
losses on AIG become unsustainable. Bankruptcy is a more likely process if such large losses continue.  
The $6 billion loss on the Fed’s AIG-related SIVs, is larger than losses on the toxic securities acquired by 
the Fed’s first SIV, which houses securities acquired from the Bear Stearns failure. Together these losses 
have absorbed about 30 percent of the Fed’s annual payments to the Treasury from its profits.  This sum 
is growing and does not include losses on the extensive private credit facilities that have been created 
over the past two years.  Should these losses continue to cumulate, financial sector pressures and 
congressional pressures will mount to limit or end such new ventures by the Fed.  Fed credit can more 
safely and prudentially grow by purchases of U.S. government debt, with the marketplace determining 
where the new Fed credit extensions are ultimately allocated, instead of the Fed attempting to assess the 
solvency and liquidity of particular financial firms and sectors and directly lending to them.7      
IV. Three new challenges to U.S. regulatory reform 
One of the key differences in U.S. and European regulatory approaches has been the evolution of the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), first in Great Britain, as the model for regulatory reform.  The 
presumption has been that the competing U.S. regulatory bodies with overlapping responsibilities have 
been inefficient and have put the focus on specific regulatory silos for different types of financial 
institutions. The growing convergence of financial institutions who share particular types of risk of 
concern to regulators has led to an FSA-approach where all institutions are regulated and the focus of 
differentiation is the type of risk rather than institutional affiliation.  This approach is advocated by the 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (2009), the Treasury ’s Blueprint and, to a degree, in the G30 
report.  Interestingly, the Vice Chair of the European Central Bank has taken another view, suggesting 
that the FSA approach is too slow and inefficient and not focused sufficiently on the unique issues posed 
by banking system risk. In his view, bank regulation should be given over to the European Central Bank 
in its role of protector of the banking system and at least to that extent, protector of financial stability.  
This controversy in Europe opens a new front in the debate over why financial institutions are to be 
regulated, how, and by whom.   
A second challenge reinforced by the AIG debacle is regulatory reform of the U.S. insurance industry.  
All calls for regulatory reform emphasize the importance of a federal role in regulating insurers, which 
are currently regulated by the states. Part of the AIG problem is that the losses arose at an unregulated 
subsidiary of the holding company, which technically was regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision. 
A federal role in insurance regulation could have provided a regulator that had a broader view of AIG and 
that subjected the holding company components to closer regulatory scrutiny, as the Federal Reserve 
currently does with bank holding companies.  All of the major proposals for reform call for an expanded 
                                                            
7 See Tatom (2008a, b) and Kuttner (2009) for assessments of the financial market and political effects of the Fed’s 
new policies.   
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federal role, ranging from the introduction of an optional federal charter, under which insurers could 
obtain federal charters and become subject to federal regulation instead of state regulation, to federal 
regulation of all systemically important or significant insurers as proposed by the Group of 30.8     
Another problem with the Fed becoming the financial stability regulator is that the Fed could more easily 
lose its independence in the process.  Independence is important because it allows the central bank to be 
focused on the longer term objective of maintaining the purchasing power of money or price level 
stability.  This is the only sustainable long term objective of any central bank, but because of the power to 
print money, central banks suffer from strong competing pressures to pursue a variety of other objectives.  
During the recent crisis, the Fed has engaged in another new policy that involves a shell game with the 
Treasury.9 Under this policy, the Fed borrows directly from the Treasury and then uses these new 
securities to raise funds in the securities market in order to lend to the private sector institutions.  The 
Treasury cooperates with this scheme by promising, so far, to hold the funds it receives from the Fed as 
deposits in a special account at the Fed. This keeps the Fed purchases of securities or private sector 
lending from having direct effects on bank reserves or the monetary base, but it allows the Fed to expand 
its credit to the private sector.  
This policy jeopardizes the independence of the Fed and, even more than the losses on private sector 
lending, threatens the credibility, transparency and independence of the Fed. As of February 25, 2009, the 
Fed has borrowed $200 billion from the Treasury in this special program that allows the Fed to sell the 
securities and then lend the proceeds to the private sector.  The program began in the week of September 
25, 2008 and the Fed lending under this program peaked at $558.9 billion for the week ending November 
13, 2008. At any moment the Treasury could spend the proceeds from these security sales, increasing 
bank reserves and the monetary base by a huge amount, but so far, the Treasury has respected the 
independence of the Fed and refused to use the proceeds of these special loans for financing new 
government expenditures.  If the Fed takes on a new role to protect the financial stability of the economy, 
it is likely that such new initiatives could expand, complicating the ability of the Fed to pursue monetary 
stability and price stability.  Congress will have to finesse the competing goals of price stability and short-
term objectives of financial stability if it is to ensure that the Fed maintains its traditional and well 
founded responsibilities while pursuing new short term financial market objectives.  
The Fed’s actions with regard to AIG provide strong evidence that broadening the too big to fail policy or 
broadening the Fed’s lender of last resort policy to include non-bank firms pose strong conflicts for the 
achievement of the objectives of monetary policy or of financial stability.  Moreover, the loss experience 
of AIG indicates the problems of fragmented or absent federal regulation of insurers for regulatory 
reform.   
                                                            
8 The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (2009) has not taken a position on a federal role in insurance 
regulation.  
9 See Tatom (2008b) for a fuller description of this arrangement.   
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